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Introduction          
    
 
Albania became part of World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) in 2000 after 
carrying out the negotiation process with WTO member countries. The negotiation 
process before the membership and later, the application process of commitments to 
WTO have been associated with the undertaking of reforms and standards increase, 
necessary to adapt to nowadays global trade trends. The initiatives taken by the Albanian 
state to fulfill the commitments in WTO framework are becoming more and more 
important not only because they influence the country's economic development, but also 
because they comprise "conditions" for the European and regional integration. One 
observes currently a greater awareness of the interest groups for the recognition of 
commitments made by our state to WTO and knowing more closely the way this 
organization functions. This awareness comes also as a result of effects increase by 
market liberalization, which in plain words, could be summarized in the competition 
increase, products and services greater exchange and offer, which have a direct impact on 
local business and customer interests.  
With regard to trade liberalization, WTO system achievements, among others, are 
made by the legal definition to the counter liberalization or protective actions, like an 
exception from the general rule for free trade; and the possibility to use these 
mechanisms only in situations defined in WTO agreements.  The existence of protective 
measures is often linked to the detrimental consequences mitigation for various industries 
coming mainly from market liberalization. Their use in accordance with WTO rules gives 
the possibility to industry to revive and to the government to enjoy the same support in 
the country, in spite of the measures taken.   
Therefore, in order to assist all the interest groups, it is necessary to clarify some 
of the rules and principles of this organization and the protective mechanisms existing in 
the framework of its agreement. By knowing these we understand even more the reasons 
why Albania became a WTO member, and the possibility to use the legal space to protect 
the local business. 
The article will be divided in two parts. The first will focus on the reasons giving 
birth to WTO, its principles and institutions, the mechanism solving conflicts in WTO, as 
well as the kinds of obligations and rights arising for the states. Importance will be given 
to the admission of a country to WTO, where Albania membership will be an illustration 
of the theoretical analysis following in this work. Whereas the second part will analyze 
the protective mechanisms, existing in WTO/GATT, giving a general picture of the 
conditions and concrete possibilities for using these mechanisms.  
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FIRST PART 
 
I. How was WTO born? 
 
I.1.1 GATT,  WTO predecessor 
 
The ideas given long ago for the creation of sustainable international economic 
institutions are crystallized in 1944 and later on. Two of the most important moments of 
that period relate to: 1) economic institutions creation after Bretton Woods1 system 
(World Bank and International Monetary Fund); and 2) the creation of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (hereinafter GATT). We should stress that GATT does 
not belong to Bretton Woods system, but it was created later. At that period (1946) talks 
were held on the creation of an International Trade Organization, (ITO), which would 
complete the system of economic institutions created.  While the two first ones (FMN, 
BB) would address monetary and bank problems, the latter would cover trade problems, 
completing thus the institutional framework related to world economy. It was not in vain 
that WTO, created later, was called the missing leg of the “bench” created in Bretton 
Woods system.  
ITO first draft was proposed by United States of America in 1946 followed by a 
series of discussions, where the most recent dates in 1948 in Havana. In the meantime 
together with the idea of ITO creation, the idea of GATT creation was interwoven 
(General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), as its integral part. ITO would include a treaty 
for the creation of international institutions on trade, whereas GATT would include 
firstly, negotiations on the gradual tariffs reduction and secondly, a general clause with 
regard to tariff obligations. The first efforts to create this organization failed and ITO 
never entered into force. The failure came more as a result of its disapproval by the 
American Congress, whereas continued to exist as the sole result of negotiations and 
continued to be applied under some special conditions2.  
GATT never entered into force as an international treaty and its application was 
made possible by the Provisional Protocol (PPA)3.  GATT application by this protocol 
foresaw: 1) GATT first and third part application with no exceptions; 2) second part 
application, as long as it did not come against the existing legislation of GATT4 member 
countries. So, GATT Contracting Parties had the right of the so-called “grand father 
                                                 
1 Bretton Woods Conference was held in 1944 in USA and it addressed the solution of many economic 
problems generated by the war and those existing before World War II.   
2 Though USA was the initiator of this agreement, GATT 47 was never ratified by American Congress and 
USA ratified it only when they ratified Marrakech Agreement that created WTO. It remained only a 
document signed by the American President, which worried many lawyers of the time about its practical 
application in USA. For more, see: Raj Bhala “International Trade Law; Theory and Practice, Second 
Edition, Lexis Nexis 2001, p. 129 
3 See: John H. Jackson “The World trading system” Law and policy of International Economic Relations” 
Second Edition, MIT press, 2002. p.39 
4 GATT first part referred to MFN tariffs (principle of most favored nation) the third part was totally 
procedural. The second part had to do with the important obligations like the customs quotes procedures 
and other protective measures. 
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clause5”, which in some way, convinced them to agree on GATT existence. One of WTO 
achievements was exactly the elimination of these clauses.  
In spite of the its difficulties of foundation and application from the international 
point of view, GATT went on existing for a relatively long time and it served as a basic 
document for the negotiations round about trade relations. GATT also offered a system of 
conflicts solving, which though not very successful, helped in some way in the practical 
application of this agreement.  
 
 
I.1.2 WTO Creation 
 
During the years of GATT existence eight rounds were held focused mainly on 
tariffs reduction and the discussion of other non tariff questions related to trade until 
WTO creation itself6. Uruguay round (1986-1993) was followed by Marrakech 
agreement signing, which sanctioned the creation of the organization itself on April 15, 
1994.  WTO was created as an international organization and the multilateral agreements 
its constituent parts included more than products trade7. Moreover in WTO framework 
the most efficient mechanism of conflicts solving was designed, which was not 
encountered before under the international organizations umbrella8. 
From a general survey, the scheme of the treaties founded in Uruguay Treaty is: 
The WTO Creation Treaty and the three Annexes. Annex I “Multilateral Agreement on 
Gods Trade” include the important agreements like GATT 949 and the Specific 
Agreements10, The General Agreement on Trade and Services (hereinafter GATS), and 
the Agreement on Trade Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs).  The 
second included Agreement on Conflicts Solving (hereinafter DSU) and the third 
included Mechanisms of Trade Policies Review. The acceptance of these treaties as a 
“single undertaking”, so as “single package”, marks an important step in the negotiations. 
The price of joining WTO is precisely the membership in the agreement that created 
                                                 
5 “Grand father clause” was the right, recognized for GATT Contracting Parties to deviate from the 
obligations, deriving from its second part, when they come against existing home laws. 
6 GATT rounds until WTO creation are: Geneva Round 1940, Annecy Round (1948-1949), Torquay Round 
(1950-1951), Geneva Round (1955-1956), Dillon Round (1960-1962), Kennedy Round (1964-1967), 
Tokyo Round (1973-1979), and Uruguay Round (1986-1994). An increase of member countries was 
observed during these rounds, a greater involvement of world trade in dollar value and the negotiations 
became complex leading to difficulties in decision making. For more see for each round: Raj Bhala supra 
note, 2, p 132  
7 The agreement range comprised also fields untouched until then, like services, intellectual property, and 
other investments. 
8 Patricio Grane “Remedies under WTO law” Journal of International Economic Law 2001, p. 755  
9 Connection between current GATT (94) and GATT (47) is foreseen in paragraph 4, article 2 of the 
agreement which created WTO. Both agreements are legally different and they contain different clauses. 
This means that GATT 94 is not subsequent to GATT 47 
10 In Annex 1A of the multilateral Agreements on goods, besides GATT 94, included are the Agreements 
on Agriculture (AoA), on Sanitary and Phyto - Sanitary Measures (SPS), on Technical Barriers in Trade 
(TBT), on Trade in Investments Measures (TRIMS), on products Origin Rules, Import Licenses, on 
Antidumping and Protective Measures. Parts of this Annex are also the Memoranda of Understanding on 
GATT 47 existing articles interpretation, the legal status of which is unclear. For most of the member 
countries they define a general obligation or clarification of procedures already applied and recognized by 
WTO member countries. For more, see: J. Jackson, supra note 3, p. 77 
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WTO and the multilateral agreements mentioned above11.  The only legal package is 
accepted not only by member countries in the moment of WTO creation, but also by 
countries which will join later12. 
 Besides the multilateral13 agreements which are optional, everything else is 
compulsory for the parties. This acceptance of the agreements as a single package brings 
about some difficulties during their practical application and concretely in cases when 
they norm the same fields. Thus, many GATT 47 articles have been completed by special 
agreements14, which, n case of conflict, have priority over its other articles. Anyhow, in 
spite of this general rule, referring to the WTO Jury and Appeal Body jurisprudence, we 
may say that the relations between them are characterized by: conflict, obligations 
evading, repetition and duplicity15.  
In case of conflicts between GATT and agreements that are part of various 
annexes, the rule followed is that the specific agreements (lex specialis) 16 have priority 
for questions regarding their regulatory spectrum. 
 
  
I.1.3 Main WTO Institutions  
 
In order to strengthen the rule of law and order principle in trade relations within 
WTO, its founders created the institutional mechanisms for decision making, agenda 
processing, management of market liberalization, trade policies review and conflicts 
solution.  
Ministers Conference is the highest decision taking body for all the questions 
regarding agreements, for the admission of new members and for the beginning of trade 
rounds. It consists of all member countries representatives17 and it convenes at least once 
in 2 years18. In the interval between the two meetings, the organization activity is led by 
                                                 
11 Christopher Arup “The new World Trade Organization Agreements, Globalizing law through services 
and intellectual property”, Cambridge University press, 2000, p 47 
12 Read article II together with article XII of WTO agreement. 
13Multilateral Agreements are: Agreement on Civil Airplanes Trade, Agreement on Public Procurements, 
International Agreement on Dairies, International Agreement on Meat and Livestock.   
14 It is about Antidumping agreements, Subsidizing and Counteracting Measures, Protective Emergent 
Measures, etc. In GATT 47 Agreement they were summarized in some special articles, like article IV, XIX, 
etc.  
15 The WTO institutions general spirit is that of applying the agreements cumulatively and in this context a 
special aid is given by Vienna Convention on International Treaties 1969. For more, see n relations 
between GATT and other agreements in annex IA:  Elisabetta Montaguti & Maurits Lugard: “ The GATT 
1994 and other Annex 1ª Agreements: Four different relationships?”, Journal of International Economic 
Law , 2000, p.473-484 
16 For questions regarding the intellectual property TRIPs has priority over GATT because the first is 
qualified as lex specialis by the Jury in the question India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R. For more, see: Marc Bronkers: “The Exhaustion of Patent 
Rights under the WTO Law”, Journal of World Trade, 32(5), 1998, p. 143   
17 Article IV:1 of WTO creation agreement. 
18 Since WTO creation 5 Ministers Conferences have been held: Singapore (1996), Geneva 1998, Seattle 
1999, Doha 2001 and Cancun 2003. Doha marked the opening of a new important Round in reaching some 
compromises and its Development Agenda continues to be negotiated. Cancun made no progress and the 
parties continued to disagree on many questions, which will be part of the discussion in the new meeting in 
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the General Council which is also made up of member state representatives. There are 
two specialized bodies under it, The Trade Policies Review Body and the Disagreements 
Solving Body (hereinafter DSB), who operate according to the respective procedures and 
comprise of member state representatives. With regard to special agreements, WTO 
foresees a special council for each agreement, like the Products, services and Intellectual 
Property Council. The Ministers Conference is also responsible for the creation of 
specific Committees, like the Development Committee, Trade and Environment 
Committee. (see: annex I)  
 
I.1.4 Principles on which WTO trade system functions 
 
Since WTO agreements are complex and cover a range of fields and are applied 
by a great number of countries, they rely o some principles which serve also as the 
foundations of the multilateral trade system sustainability itself. In broad lines they may 
be summarized in (1) the nondiscrimination principle and this includes: (A) the Principle 
of the Most Favored Nation and (B) National Treatment, (2) Free Trade, which should be 
realized gradually by negotiations, (3) Predictability, which is realized through 
compulsoriness19 and transparency20, (4) Promotion of a fair competition (reciprocity), 
(5) Encouragement of development and reforms21. Each of these principles is concretely 
reflected in the agreement articles having the same applicability importance. Anyhow,  
will focus on some of them further on. 
 
I.1.4.1 Principle of the Most Favored Nation  
 
The first obligation arising by membership in WTO and in the relevant 
agreements is that of the Principle of Most Favored Nation application (MFN), on the 
basis of which every WTO member state should accord to all other member countries the 
same treatment, privilege, advantage accorded to a concrete country for the trade 
relations in goods, for the intellectual property and services22. This obligation reduces 
progressively the discrimination level among the countries in trade relations23. The 
achievement of this obligation in itself relies on the “immediate” and “unconditional” 
principles, which means that the non discriminatory treatment will be accorded to all the 
countries at the same time, and on the other hand, this treatment will be accorded to WTO 
member countries without expecting any profit in the exchange and without requiring the 
fulfillment of any concrete condition by the other party. Anyway, exceptions are made 
                                                                                                                                                 
Geneva in 2005. We may mention here agriculture, “Singapore questions which include competition and 
trade, investments, transparency, public procurements, intellectual property and industry”.   
19 Compulsoriness is created by the obligation to keep a certain level of tariffs and quotes.  
20 Transparency requires making public the norms and rules regarding trade and the continuous informing 
of WTO. 
21 Understanding the WTO: “Principle of the Trading System”, in WTO Webpage, www.wto.org 
22 See: Article I of GATT 94 and Article II of GATS, Article 4 of TRIPs, which summarize the same 
terminology.  
23 The Principle of the Most Favored Nation comprises: Change of tariffs and other obligations applied in 
trade relations, their mode of establishment, administrative procedures in customs, the legal regime of sale, 
transport, distribution of goods and services in a certain territory and the rules which cover the intellectual 
property, the patent and the copyright.  
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from the application of this principle among others in two cases: 1) In case of the creation 
of a customs union and a free trade zone24; 2) in the preferential relations established 
between a developed country and a developing country25.  
 
 
I.1.4.2 National Treatment (NT) 
 
While MFN principle is linked to the trade regime among states, often known as 
“norm applied in the borders” the National Treatment principle is linked to the trade 
regime inside the country. This principle sanctions the obligation of every member state 
to treat equally the local products and services and those of the other countries, fulfilling 
thus the principle of non discrimination in trade relations inside and outside the territory 
of a state 26. Based on this principle, all the taxes, rules and laws of a country should not 
accord a more favorable treatment to local products or services with the purpose of 
protecting them against foreign products or services27. The completion of these criteria, 
so, making favors on the one hand and the protection purpose on the other, comprise 
conditions for this principle violation28. Both elements should exist simultaneously; 
therefore it is often difficult to verify them in practice. A great assistance was given by 
the Jury and the Appeal Body in WTO, in their verification from case to case, creating 
thus a rich correspondence.  
 
I.1.4.3 Reciprocity Principle 
 
 Reciprocity principle existed in trade relations since GATT time and it should be 
understood more in the political context more than the juridical one. This principle finds 
application more in negotiations between the parties and in some cases it is sanctioned in 
the agreement itself, like, for instance article XXVIII of GATT, which foresees making 
negotiations to reduce tariffs in reciprocity between the parties. Reciprocity in its earlier 
meaning was mainly the trade balance regarding tariffs. But presently, in the conditions 
of a more sophisticated negotiation by WTO member states, it is intertwined with “fair 
trade” principle29, which is translated into a reciprocity for markets access, ensured also 
by issuing adequate laws and norms by one party so that the other party realizes this 
right.  
 
                                                 
24 See article XXIV of GATT 94. Based on this article, free trade agreements and customs union are 
created. Deviation from MFN is realized by the application of very low or zero tariffs only for countries 
that are parties in the se agreements, or a more favorable regime for services for the countries that are 
parties in the agreement. 
25 For example, European Union accorded before a preferential treatment to Albania in the framework of 
the General Preferential System (GSP), which allows the application of very low or zero tariffs for 
Albanian products exported to EU.  
26 See article III of GATT, article XVII of GATS and article 3 of TRIPs. 
27 Tariffs are excluded in this principle. 
28 Article III of GATT foresees among other that: The Contracting Parties accept that taxes or other 
obligations should not be applied in the imported or local products with the purpose of national production 
protection. 
29 This kind of reciprocity was called aggressive reciprocity by the individual states or groups of states. For 
more, see: Richard Senti and Patricia Conlan, World Trade Organization, 1997 
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I.1.5 Decision Making Process in WTO 
 
WTO is the only institution of the international trade system which rose as a result of the 
continuous negotiations by its founding members. Every WTO member state has the right 
of a vote30. Contrary to the other organizations like IMF or World Bank, it does not apply 
pondering in voting, as for example: percentage of a country’s weight in world trade or 
the contribution paid. So, it foresees equal voting possibility for all the countries in spite 
of there economic level31. Usually majority voting is preferred in decision taking, but for 
questions concerning GATT often consensual decision taking is preferred. Article IX of 
WTO creation agreement foresees this. This is the only article, which foresees consensual 
decision taking and it is presumed to be extended in all the Uruguay Round agreements, 
but this remains only one interpretation. On the other hand, the idea of consensus may 
give the veto right to each state. Anyhow, we should admit that there is now unanimity in 
decision taking, the states that are not present and those who abstain can not prohibit 
consensual decision taking.   
The common decisions are taken by consensus in the Ministers Conference and the 
General Council and in the cases, when the consensus is not reached, the decisions are 
taken by majority of all of the people present32. WTO agreement and its annexes 
interpretation is made by the Ministers Conference, and it is approved by ¾ of WTO 
member states. Based on WTO agreement, the Ministers Conference may vote the 
exemption of a country from the obligation of Annex I or WTO Agreement. The request 
to exempt temporarily from WTO obligation is made in the relevant Councils. To take 
such decision, when consensus is not achieved, decision is required to be taken by ¾ of 
WTO member states32. 
   
I.2 Conflicts solving  
 
Part of Uruguay Round is the Memorandum for the Rules and Procedures managing 
Solution and Disagreements (hereinafter DSU), as an integral part of WTO creation 
agreement. The conflicts solving mechanism, sanctioned in this agreement, marks an a 
achievement not only in absolute terms, that is, in the  efficiency shown within 
international system, but also in comparative terms, referring thus to other conflict 
solving mechanisms (for example International Court of Justice). Essential characteristic 
of this system is the obligation for conformity, which realizes an important element, not 
encountered before by international laws: the binding power34. Its success is linked to the 
sanctioning of some elements in article 3.2 of DSU, like: security and predictability of 
multilateral trade relations, guarantee of rights and obligations related to agreements  
for all the parties and the agreements interpretation on the bases of international right 
interpretation norms. However the advantages brought by this system compared to the 
system applied in GATT time, may be summarized in: 
 
                                                 
30 The only exception is made in the case of EU, where and European Community has one vote and each 
member country in EU has one vote, (15+1) votes. 
 8
1) Establishing and deadlines and procedures in solving disagreements, from 
consultation to the adoption of recommendation from the Jury/Appeal Body. 
2) Creation of an Appeal Body, which reviews the Jury legal interpretation of 
disagreements. The Appeal Body can not be considered as a court, it comprises a 
quasi-judicial mechanism.  
3) The immediate adoption of the Jury and Appeal Body recommendations and 
delivery of the authorization as a response, if no consensus is reached to adopt the 
report.  
4) The authority of the complaining party in order to require authorization to respond 
also in sectors that are not an object of conflict when the Jury report is not applied 
or when no satisfactory solution of the situation is achieved35. 
 
Starting from the above we reach conclusion that WTO is considered today as an 
organization with “teeth”, but this does not necessarily mean that the Jury or the Appeal 
Body may impose on one state to change or invalidate a law issued against any obligation 
of the agreement.  However, its recommendations are followed by the parties and the 
obligation for conformity creates the possibility to solve the conflict without 
counteracting as a first measure in case of violation. 
 
I.2. 1 Procedures for conflicts solving 
 
Every WTO member country should notify for issuing a rule affecting an 
agreement obligation31. This notification in most of the cases is accompanied by 
consultations that are necessary to solve the problems arising from its application, 
because it may happen that this rule comes against the agreements, causing harm on 
WTO. The interested parties should try for a satisfactory solution of the situation32.  
If such a consultation is not successful, then the affected party may deposit a 
request for the creation of the Jury (in the form of a complaint) to solve the 
disagreement33. Such a request may be made by one state or by some states together.  
The Jury body is appointed by WTO Secretariat and it should be approved by 
parties in conflict. Its members' number goes from three to five when the parties require 
the latter. They are elected from the international, jurists, where a special care is attached 
to the conflict of interests34.  
                                                 
31 It is about normal notification procedures concerning the issuing of a sanitary measure or a 
counterbalance measure, subsidies, protection etc. This is a demand contained in all the WTO agreements. 
See for example article 25 of the agreement concerning Subsidies and Counterbalancing Measures, or 
article X of GATT 47 
32 Consultation is a necessary sanctioned demand in DSU. Article 4 of this agreement foresees the goal and 
procedures to be followed so as to avoid the accusations.  
33 See article 6 of DSU . The principles on which its work relies during the solution of a conflict are 
foreseen in article 7 of DSU. 
34 Usually in the jury people who have connections with states in conflict r have a declared attitude for 
questions concerning the concrete agreement, often in this level are involved academics and people with 
knowledge in the field of international commercial law who have an open attitude for a question. WTO 
Secretariat keeps a permanent jury list. If the states who are parties in the conflict  do not agree about Jury 
body than it is elected by consultations between the General WTO Director, DSB Director and the Head of 
the Respective Council. See article 8 of DSU concerning the Jury creation.  
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After the composition of the Jury Body the hearing takes place for the claims of 
parties in the process and the third parties. The hearing is accompanied by the 
presentation of an intermediary jury report, with its comments and conclusions. Only 
after the parties have expressed their additional objections or suggestions for the first 
recommendation draft, the Jury makes the final report to be sent to DSB. 
The report should be approved by DSB within a definite time as long as the latter 
agrees, or the discontent party does not appeal he question. If the question is appealed, it 
is heard by three out of seven permanent Appeal Body members elected by DSB35 itself. 
The Appeal Body has jurisdiction only for questions concerning the law and with the 
agreements interpretation and in this case it is obliged to follow interpretations made by 
the Ministers Conference36. The Appeal Body reports are automatically adoptable by 
DSB, save the cases when no consensus is achieved to approve37. 
DSB does the monitoring of Appeal Jury and Body recommendation application 
to bring the rule that is the object of the conflict with WTO agreements in accordance 
with the respective agreement. If the state in question does not bring the law38 in 
conformity with Appeal Jury and Body recommendations, then the other party may 
require the DSB authorization for response39.  
However another possibility is offered to the discontent party by the 
recommendation application, which, after using the consultation possibility, requires 
again the creation of a new Jury to examine the compatibility with the Jury or Appeal 
Body recommendations40.  
Fr a general view made to the system of conflicts solving in WTO, we observe 
that it is accompanied by negotiations and continues consultations and with a tendency to 
apply its results41.  This unique system is conditioned by the very nature of the 
commercial relations which carry in themselves a great economic interest. In most of the 
cases it is necessary t take into account the special conditions that some countries and 
sectors involved in the conflict have.  
 
 
I.2.3 Kinds of rights used in WTO 
 
Multilateral trade system is based among others on the concept of rights and 
mutual duties for the parties relying on WTO treaties. In cases of violation of these 
                                                 
35 Article 17 of DSU 
36 Shih article IX of WTO Agreement 
37 Article 17 paragraph 14 of DSU 
38 Bringing the rule in accordance with the Recommendation can be done by an existing law amendment or 
its total invalidation. The jury bodies may make suggestions for the manner of bringing the situation in 
accordance with the agreement, but this remains in the framework of voluntary and not compulsory 
recommendations to be applied by the states. See article 19 of DSU. 
39 Article 22.6 of DSU 
40 See article 21. 5 of DSU and 22.2 , 22.6 of DSU. During the application of this procedure and the article 
on the authorization for counterbalancing response, a conflict has been observed in the schedules placed by 
them, which has created the so-called "Sequencing Problem", encountered for the first time in the case of 
Bananas, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997  
41Antonio Casses “ International Law” Oxford University Press 2001, p. 225  
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obligations or rights deriving from agreements, every WTO member state may require 
the interruption of these acts through the conflicts solving mechanism.42  
The current mechanism offered by WTO foresees explicitly giving up one act or 
law coming against the agreement and bringing the situation in accordance with the 
recommendations given by WTO conflicts solving bodies43. This right leads us to the 
conclusion that the restitution notion, status quo ante, known by international law is 
applied to some extent in the context of WTO laws. So, the right claimed in WTO 
framework is prospective and it does not aim at restituting to the former state the parties 
in conflict, being thus in complete accordance with the perception of this means in the 
framework of international public right.  
Article 3 (7) of DSU foresees hierarchically the rights that may be used in by 
parties in the conflicts solving mechanism. 
First, the removal of the measure which is against an article of the agreement is 
required. 
Second, the compensation is required, which is realized only when the law 
invalidation is practically impossible or when it serves as a temporary measure not in 
conformity with the agreement until the law invalidation.  
 Third, the claiming country may suspend the application of concessions or other 
mutual obligations deriving from the agreement, after it has been authorized by DSB44.  
In the cases of claims without agreement violation 45, the first means used is 
compensation. The state which prevented “the satisfactory effects” that had to be realized 
by the agreement application is not obliged to invalidate the law that brought this 
obstacle, but only to compensate the other party.  
 
 
I.3 Albania and WTO 
 
I.3.1 Membership Process  
 
A few rules have been sanctioned in WTO for the conditions and the way of 
admission of a country in WTO. WTO, like many international organizations is 
composed of states that founded it and states that joined it in 199546 based on article XII 
of WTO Agreement. Not much is understood by the content of article XII about the 
criteria and procedures for a country’s admission in WTO, creating thus a legal vacuum 
for the membership process. Membership has been realized more on the basis of 
unwritten rules and practically necessary precedents have been created to sanction the 
administrative way of membership. 
                                                 
42 Shih DSU treated above, I.2 
43 Neni 19 i DSU 
44 Neni 3 (7) i DSU 
45 Shih nenin XXIII të GATT. Këtu bëhet fjalë për ato ligje të cilat nuk bien ndesh me marrëveshjet e 
WTO-së por pengojnë realizimin e të drejtave dhe përfitimeve të ofruara nga marrëveshjet. 
46 Since 1995 about 47 countries have applied and negotiated to become WTO members and from these 
countries half have been countries with an economy in transition, see: Marc Bacchetta and Zdenek Drabek: 
“ Effects of WTO Accession on Policy Making in Sovereign States: ”Preliminary lessons from the recent 
experience of transition countries”, WTO Staff working Paper, 2002 p. 2  in www.wto.org 
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Membership is made by negotiations for the “admission terms” between the 
candidate country and WTO and these terms are different for different states, as a 
consequence, the economic condition of a state determines the admission terms. These 
“terms” consist in a number of obligations deriving from the agreements and in definite 
trade policies contained in the membership Protocol of each state. The negotiated 
conditions are closely connected with the status by which one country joins WTO. The 
latter is important because it conditions the transitory period of WTO agreements 
application. So article XIV of WTO agreement foresees that the countries which have 
accepted WTO agreement, after its entry into force, apply the concessions and other 
obligations after a period of time starting from the moment this agreement enters into 
force as if they had accepted the agreement since the date of its entry into force47. So as a 
conclusion a transitory period has been foreseen for all the countries becoming WTO 
members. 
The admission status is also linked with the possibility of using the “Preferential 
Treatment" clauses, defined in WTO agreements48. These clauses have been used for the 
less developed and developed countries, which should be qualified as such in the moment 
of joining WTO. In the framework of WTO currently there is no definition about the 
developing countries, they may be declared as such in the moment of joining WTO and 
everything depends on the negotiated terms. Concerning the less developed the situation 
is simpler, because they are recognized as such by United Nations, which have a list for 
such countries.  
The admission process is characterized by asymmetrical relations, because the 
countries joining WTO, cannot negotiate with the existing countries other additional 
benefits, and the WTO existing countries require no more than a status quo.  It has been 
observed that in most of the cases the countries joining later have been required to 
undertake more obligations than the existing WTO countries49, because the organization 
itself has in its foundations the continuous trade liberalization. 
 
 
I.3.2 Membership of Albania in WTO   
   
Albania like many other states became WTO member with complete rights and 
obligations, after handing over and ratifying the membership protocol, based on article 
XII of WTO agreement50.  The protocol is the company by the Work Group Report10, 
                                                 
47 See: Law on admission of Albania in WTO, Law No. 8648, date 28/7/2000 
48 The Preferential and Differential Treatment Clauses have been included in WTO agreements for the 
developing and less developed countries in order to teach two goals: first, to create equal conditions and a 
fair competition when the countries infrastructure is different; second, to avoid the deformations coming 
from the negotiating power of the developed countries. These treatments consist in the temporary 
derogation frm the agreements obligations, reduced tariffs for these countries goods, decrease of subsidies, 
defining a basis for the countervailing measures and the and limited flexibility for the specific obligations. 
Howevber, durin the years of WTO existence, the use of these rights was not easy for the above categories 
and the content of these laws has been much contested. The S&D treatment is part of Doha Agenda for 
renegotiation and improvement, with the purpose of using them by less developed countries. See: ”Doha 
Round Briefing series, Special and Differential Treatment” , ICTSD, Vol.1 No 13, February 2003  
49 Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki “ The Political Economy of the World Trading System ; 
The WTO and Beyond” Second Edition , Oxford University Press 2001, p. 67 
50 Albania ratified the Protocol of admission in WTO by Law 8648, date 28/7/2000 
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which contains the schedule of commitments for the immediate and gradual liberalization 
of products tariffs and the services liberalization schedule, the application of standards 
for intellectual property protection and this document contains also the reforms related  to 
privatization and a series of other measures concerning of  institutionalization  of market 
economy in Albanian The status with itch Albanian joined WTO, is that of a country with 
economy in transition51. This is observed also in the commitments that it has under taken 
for the reforms in the privatization of state companies. This can also be observed in the 
commitments it has made for the state companies privatization. A general view of the 
Protocol observes two categories of obligations. The first are in concrete terms and 
consist in fulfilling the commitments of the kind of tariffs reducing an services 
liberalization, which will be realized by applying the above-mentioned WTO principles. 
The second category has to do with the laws harmonization and bringing them in 
accordance with Uruguay Round agreements. Special agreements require that this 
bringing be continuous and Albania should notify WTO whenever it issues or amends a 
law affecting the fields related with them.  
The obligations undertaken by Albania are unavoidable as long as they are linked 
with the obligations defined b the agreements themselves. For example: a change in the 
tariff higher than that defined by the membership Protocol would comprise a violation of 
article II:1 of GATT 94. This would give the right to every trade partner with Albania to 
require the change or the cancellation of this law that sanctions the tariff not in 
conformity with the commitments schedule, or give the right to him to require the 
authorization for response.  The only way to deviate from the agreements obligations is 
the use of protection mechanisms offered by the agreements themselves for this purpose, 
which are the object of the second part of this article52.  
To realize the continuous communication among the groups of interest within the 
country, and within Albania and WTO, the WTO Secretariat has been erected in the 
Ministry of Economy. By this organization, Albania realizes also one of the important 
WTO principles like that of transparency and continuous notification.  
It remains interesting to clarify which is the status of the agreement itself in our 
internal system from the international law point of view. Is it possible that agreement 
articles be invoked by Albanian Courts?  
First, we may say that WTO agreements have been ratified on the basis of 
Constitution articles that cover international agreements53. Based on article 122 of the 
Constitution, these agreements become part of our internal system when they are ratified 
and published in the official gazette and they are directly applicable when they define 
explicit obligations and rights54.  
The direct application of WTO agreement is part of an open debate and it is 
determined by two elements: first, by the kind of system in which a country is classified; 
                                                 
51 Marc Bacchetta and Zdenek Drabek, supra note 43 
52 GATT and other WTO agreements allow temporary evasion of obligations in situations defined by law 
and on the basis of procedures offered by agreements. In every case the balance of a free trade should not 
be lost and this should be shown in every mechanism used. 
53 WTO membership protocol was ratified on the basis of articles 78, 83.1 and 121 of Albanian 
constitution. 
54 Articles 122 of Albanian constitution. 
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dualist or monist55, and second, by the nature of the agreement itself, “self applicability” 
of its articles56. Article 122/1 of the Constitution foresees that the international 
agreements become part of our internal system after their ratification in the parliament 
and the publication in the Official Gazette. From this point of view we may say that 
Albania belongs to the monist system. On the other hand this paragraph foresees that the 
agreements are directly applied when they are self applicable. To define this status of  
WTO agreements (their self applicability) the experience of other countries like EU or 
USA will be taken into consideration, as long as  the Albanian Courts have not made any 
interpretation of this agreement. The courts of these countries have qualified GATT and 
the other WTO agreements not directly applicable57. This line of reasoning is assisted by 
the fact that these agreements are addressed to the states and do not generate rights and 
duties for the individuals58. WTO system itself or its agreements do not foresee the 
exhaustion of the internal judicial system before a case goes to the Jury in WTO59. So if 
the jurisprudence of these Courts will hire by the Albanian Courts in the framework of 
the comparative legislation, then the agreements would not be directly applicable even in 
our internal system.  
 
 
SECOND PART 
 
II.1. General Survey on WTO protective mechanisms 
 
In general the trade agreements allow the general protection and exemption from 
some obligations deriving from them. This possibility consists in recognizing the right of 
a government or of a country to abandon or modify temporarily an obligation deriving 
from trade relations with the scope of home product protection.  
In the General Agreement on Trade and Traffic (hereinafter GATT), part of Uruguay 
Round agreements60, such mechanisms are foreseen, which though an open violation of 
free trade, have always been acceptable by the negotiating parties because they served as 
an “rescue valve” for the governments of various states. The moderate clauses in 
                                                 
55 The monist system changes the international norm and makes it part of the internal only through the 
ratification of the agreement by a constitutional body, whereas the dualist system considers it as a special 
part from internal norms and it is transformed into an internal law only by special mechanisms (like the 
issuing of a law) for the application of an international norm in the internal legislation, in every sovereign 
state. For more see the systems: Cassese, supra note 45, p.163 
56 For more see: John Jackson; “Status of Treaties in domestic legal systems- A Policy Analysis”, American 
Journal of International Law, 86,310 , 1992  
57 See: Meinhard Hilf, “The Role of National Courts in International Trade Relations”, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 18, 321, 1997 , Decision of European Court of Justice in the case: Portugal gainst 
European Council, C-149/96, 1999 
58 Geert A Zonnekeyn “The Latest on Indirect Effect of the WTO Law in the EC Legal Order; The 
Nakajima case law Misjudged?” Journal of International Economic Law (2002) 597-608  
59 In spite of this conclusion, many authors have thrown the idea that invoking WTO laws in the internal 
system would strengthen the latter. The only achievement that might be mentioned in ths context is the 
decision of EU First Instance Court in cases Cordis against European Union T- 18/99, Bocchi Food Trade 
International against European Union, T-30/99, March 2001, which accepts the review of European rules in 
the light of WTO norms. See: ibid, and Hilf, supra note. 63 
60 Uruguay Round took place in 1986-1994 
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WTO/GATT agreements for the protective and exclusion mechanisms are divided in two 
main categories61:  
1) In the first group are those mechanisms which refer to the situations defined 
legally and which allow a gradual increase of import barriers62. In this group the 
division is made between those situations which are called “unfair trade”, which 
in most cases are subsidies for export and the other group foresees those situations 
that are not necessarily linked to the actions which comprise unfair trade, as for 
instance the emergent measures against imports increase.  
2) In the second group exemptions from the general obligation are foreseen. This 
group includes the articles foreseeing protective measures for moral, public 
health, natural resources reasons. The measures taken in this context should not be 
discriminating and should not prevent free trade63. For example: Measures taken 
for national security; and the possibility to negotiate and modify schedules when 
the compensation has been offered by the country which requires applying this 
right.  
 
The focus of this work will be the legal and practical clarification of some of these 
mechanisms64. A good part of them today is represented by special agreements like the 
one for antidumping or the protective measures. Since these agreements have a very large 
range of problems and require a true study, their elaboration will be general. The greatest 
concentration will be on GATT articles and references in specific agreements that will be 
made in case of changes or for further clarifications. 
In general these mechanisms are used for the protection of special industries and fro 
these only three (trade balance, general exemptions and national security), require a 
larger economic reasoning. The measures referring to special industries are supported by 
a certain category of argumentation and claim, which are related mainly to the local 
companies’ protection from the foreign competition.  
 
II.1.1 Renegotiation of concessions (article XXVIII of GATT) 
 
Scheduling of the concessions attached to the protocol of a country admission in 
WTO, comprises the schedule that is attached to GATT 94 agreement as an annex65. 
Tariffs in this schedule are compulsory for application by all member countries and every 
change in them that is not in conformity with the rules comprises a violation of article 
II:1 of GATT66.  
                                                 
61 Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki “The Political Economy of the World Trading System; the 
WTO and Beyond” 2Ed. Oxford Press, 2001, p. 303 
62 We might mention here: Anti dumping, Counteracting Measures, Measures for the payments balance, 
Protection of infant industries, Specific protection measures, etc. 
63 See article XX of GATT, the paragraphs of this article are read in accordance with  its preamble which 
foresees prohibition of discrimination in the measures taken for the environment or people’s life protection 
and are accompanied by trade restrictions. 
64 The listing row makes no difference for the importance or hierarchy of these articles. The advantages and 
difficulties of their practical application will be presented for all the elaborated articles. 
65 Article II: 7 of GATT 94 
66 Article II: 1 of GATT 94 foresees that: Each contracting party should accord to the other party in trade no 
less favorable treatment than the one presented to the relevant schedule, annex of this agreement. 
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The compulsory tariffs may be modified or drawn only on the basis of rules set in article 
XXVIII of GATT 94.  Tariffs negotiation has been used almost every year of GATT 
existence (1947-1995) and more rarely in WTO framework67. In GATT jurisprudence, 
only one case was brought before the Jury in the framework of this article's second 
paragraph68. 
The main principles on which concessions modification or removal are realized are:   
1) compensation by the country that requires such a thing (hereinafter we will refer 
to it as the applicant country) liberalizing other products. 
2)  Preserving the same reciprocity and bilateral advantage for the concessions, so 
preserving the same favorable treatment for other countries.  (article XXVIII: 2)69 
Paragraphs of article XXVIII in broad lines include: 
• The negotiation period for removing or modifying the concession. 
• Countries involved in negotiations or consultations. 
• Actions to be taken after the negotiations, whether an agreement has been reached 
or not between the parties.  
Article XXVIII of GATT defines the continuous right within the defined deadlines 
for each state to negotiate the concessions whereas article XXVIII bis defines the rules 
for a multilateral round where all the countries for tariffs negotiations are involved. 
A three year period starting from 1958 comprises the renegotiation legal period for 
the schedules modification or removal. Based on paragraph I of article XXVIII of GATT 
94 and Ad Article XXVIII, the applicant country will notify all the countries for its aim 
of modification and it should do this no later than 6 months and no earlier than 3 months, 
before the ending of the legal period, (e.g.: between 1.7. 1987 and 30.9.87 before the 
starting of a three year period, for example, 1st of January 1988). Albania might use this 
possibility at the end of 2003, so that it could reflect the changes in 2004 Fiscal Package. 
In spite of this three year legal period, paragraph  4 of article XXVIII recognizes  
the applicant country the right to make such a request at any time, requiring a preliminary 
authorization by the member countries, after it has presented this request to the Products 
Council.  
Paragraph 5 of the article also defines that every state may reserve this right for the 
coming legal period, notifying the countries before the end of the three year legal period.  
 
II.1.1.1 What should notification include 
 
Notification should include products and tariffs respective numbers for which 
modification is required, and the countries which have the right of the first negotiator for 
this product. It should be clearly defined whether it is for modification or withdrawal 
from the obligation taken. If it is about the modification, then the offered change should 
be presented for notification, or notified to the partied concerned as soon as possible. 
                                                 
67 Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki, supra note 67, p. 309. The authors relate this fact to the 
readjustment of tariffs as a result of Harmonized System application by WTO member states. 
68 Canada-Withdrawal from Tariffs Concessions – Jury Report, L/4636-25S/42, 28 April 1978. The 
question had to do with renegotiation for the tariffs modification from specific to Ad valorem, for zinc and 
lead, between European Economic Community and Canada. The latter claimed that this modification of 
tariffs comprised a violation of  paragraph 2 of article XXVIII of GATT.  
69 See: Instruction for tariffs notifications and non tariff measures in WTO Web Page: 
WT/TC/NOTIF/MA/1 
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Import statistics in a three year period for this product should be attached to the 
notification.  If the applicant country presents no statistics for import, then it should take 
into consideration export statistics offered by the parties interested in this concession. 
Rom the date the statistics are made available, the other countries have 90 days available 
to notify their interest for participation in this renegotiation70. 
 
II.1.1.2 Countries taking part in the renegotiation:  
 
According to paragraph I of article XXVIII, the applicant country should negotiate with: 
a) countries that have negotiated since the beginning with the applicant country: 
nluded here are the countries which have bilateral agreements and are registered in the 
schedule, and those who took part in the negotiation round. With regard to the latter, 
the countries are considered t have an initial negotiation right if they demonstrate a 
principal interest, which is proved by taking into consideration a reasonable period. 
This reasonable period is calculated on the trade exchanges between the two countries 
for three years.  
   b) countries which have a principal interest: are considered those countries, which 
during the reasonable period, before the renegotiations have a greater concentration of 
trade in the applicant country market, than in the countries with which negotiation was 
held at the beginning, or that they would have had in absence of discrimination in quotes. 
To this category might be added also countries which show a great interest, because this 
product occupies an important place in its export.( Ad article XXVIII:7) .  
c) countries with a substantial interest: this category includes countries which have or 
should have had in absence of discrimination in quantity restrictions, a significant part of 
the applicant country market. In GATT practice, a 10 % of the applicant country market 
has been recognized as a general rule to qualify the country as a substantial supplier of 
the applicant country. 
Every country which thinks that it has a principal or substantial interest in the 
concession in question and willing to negotiate should, in the period of 90 days, after the 
distribution of statistics, communicate its claims in a written form to the applicant 
country and inform WTO secretariat. If these claims are accepted by the applicant 
country, then the country in question takes part in the negotiations, otherwise the country 
raising the claim should address the claim to the Council.  
 
II.1.1.3 Negotiations results  
  
Three situations are foreseen as possible to happen after the renegotiations: 
1) Countries with principal and substantial interest reach an agreement: the countries 
are notified about the result and the tariff is modified. Negotiations should be concluded 
before the application of the new tariff. 
2) Countries with principal interest reach an agreement, but countries with 
substantial interest do not agree, the latter are free that no latter than 6 months, after 
concluding the agreement, counteract removing an equivalent concession, negotiated at 
the beginning with the applicant country. (Article XXVIII: 3 (b). 
                                                 
70 ibid., 
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3)  Countries with principal interest cannot achieve an agreement before the end of 
the legal period defined by paragraph I; the applicant country is again free to withdraw or 
modify  the concession, but all the countries who were involved in negotiations or 
consultations are also allowed that, no later than 6 months after the end of the meeting 
respond by withdrawing an  equivalent concession, negotiated since the beginning with 
he applicant country (XXVIII: 3(a))71 
 
II.1.1.4 Interpretation memorandum for article XXVIII of GATT 94 
 
Some paragraphs of article XXVIII of GATT 47 have been discussed in Uruguay 
Round. They refer to: a) additional definitions for the countries which have a principal 
interest, b) trade level between influenced countries, c) modification for new products, d) 
substitution of tariffs with tariff quotes, e) giving a right for initial negotiation.  
a) Countries with additional principal interest: are the countries that have a high 
export percentage influenced by this concession. These countries are not part of the 
category of the countries foreseen in paragraph of article XXVIII. The aim of adding this 
category is to allow in negotiation also countries with a small or average level export. 
b) Trade based on MFN tariff: only trade based on MFN tariff should be 
considered for the definition of a country with principal interest. This paragraph will not 
be applied in cases when trade between countries involved a) is increased as a result of 
the preferential treatment or b) will become such after concluding the negotiations. 
c) New products: When a tariff has been withdrawn or modified n the products for 
which there are no three year statistics, the right of the first negotiating country is given 
to the country to which this right was given when other classifications were used: some 
clarifications are given me also for the countries that are categorized in the group of 
countries with principal and substantial interest. 
d) Tariff quotes: When a tariff has been substituted by a quote, the compensation 
amount should surpass the trade quantity influenced by this substitution, but it should not 
surpass the amount o compensation caused by the complete withdrawal of the 
concession. 
e) Countries with new renegotiating right- the country having a principal interest 
in the modified or withdrawn concession, will be recognized this right in the 
compensating concession, as long as they do not agree for another compensating way 
between them.  
 The above clarified elements should be included in the notification document of each 
country that requires renegotiating the tariffs. By a general look at the article we can s 
that the consultations and the political will between the parties is the one which defines 
the negotiations results. In the case of Albania the article application was somewhat 
difficult because in most of the cases, the argumentations built for the protection policies 
required by home industries, are not supported by statistical data72.  
 
 
II.2. Exemption from WTO and GATT obligations (Article IX:3 of WTO and 
Article XXV:of GATT, Waiver) 
                                                 
71 ibid. 
72 See statistical data on beer or oil in ACIT database. www.acit-al.org 
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WTO and GATT agreements allow the exemption of a state from the obligations 
deriving from them, but the realization of this possibility is practically difficult. The rules 
for granting this exemption are foreseen in article XXV:5 of GATT and article IX:3 
WTO Agreement. Though article IX:3 is more detailed, both articles define the same 
main criteria for granting it. Firstly:  the exemption will be allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances and secondly: only when approved by a supermajority of WTO members 
(3/4 of the members). 
The fact should be stressed that there is no large definition of what exceptional 
circumstance means in the framework of the article. Moreover, no reference is made to 
some other GATT article or in situation dictated by WTO agreement articles in general73. 
Rom the practice of this article application, it has been observed that in most of the cases 
the exemption has been made for bilateral agreements that were not qualified on the basis 
of article XXIV74 of GATT  and comprised a violation for the other GATT articles75. 
Paragraph 4 of article IX of WTO Agreement defines that giving this preference 
should be justified by exceptional circumstances that dictate it and it should also be 
accompanied by the conditions and terms that accompany this exemption. Usually the 
exemption from the obligations is given for one year. In the cases when it is given for 
more than one year, it should be accompanied by a reassessment of the situation that 
dictated it, so that assessment can be made whether the exceptional circumstances still 
exist an giving this exemption is justified.  
Concerning the request for voting, article XXV: 5 of GATT foresees two separate 
situations: 
1) First, the contracting parties should vote by 2/3 in order to give the right of 
exemption from obligations for the applicant country.  
2) Second, this participation of 2/3 should include more than half of the contracting 
parties.  
In the case of the exceptional situation voting, that is, when the parties convene to 
vote whether a concrete situation is qualified as such or not, the contracting parties might 
chnge the voting formula. But they should never avoid the threshold of 50+1. 
This dividing voting test foreseen in GATT has been changed by article IX:3 (a) 
of WTO, which foresees only voting by ¾. According to this article every exemption 
from the multilateral agreements (including GATT) should be approved by ¾ of 
Ministers Conference members. Article IX:3 (b), foresees that initially the request to be 
exempt from obligations is addressed to the relevant Council, as for example, that of 
products, services or intellectual property. The latter presents this request to the Ministers 
Conference within 90 days. The conference defines whether exceptional circumstances 
justifying the measure taken exist, the conditions and terms that should be attached to it, 
                                                 
73 Note on Waivers and Amendments in Raj Bhala:” International Trade Law: Theory and Practice”, Lexis 
nexis, 2Ed. 2001, p. 580 
74 Article XXIV of GATT defines the conditions and rules for the creation of Free Trade Agreement and 
the Customs Unions.  
75 See: USA request for giving again the exemption for the agreement signed with Canada about cars, 
Goods Council Work Group: “United States-Imports of Automotive Products” G/L/103, 4/09/1996.  
Likewise exemption was granted for the partnership agreement between European Community and African 
Countries until 2007 for the application of preferential tariffs for products coming from African Countries 
to EU.  In both cases the agreements comprises a violation of article I of GATT, that is, the MFN principle.  
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and the reassessment of the situation if prolongation or removal of exemption is required. 
In all these stages the Ministers Conference cplys the same role played by GATT Goods 
Council before WTO existence.  
For different aspects WTO requires the surmounting of the proving burden by the 
country requesting the exemption. In many cases the exemption might consist in 
prolonging a period for an obligation application, or a transitory period, and in this 
context many of WTO agreements include articles of special and differentiated treatment 
(S&D) for the developing and the less developed countries. The use of these article is 
easier because it requires a simple consensus for the prolongation of the transitory 
period76, in the meantime, exemption (waiver) requires a voting by  ¾, which is 
practically difficult to be reached. Therefore WTO member countries unable to use 
articles S&D, are obliged to fulfill politically and economically the difficult obligations 
included in the agreement77.  Albania has invoked this article (IX: 3 of WTO) for the 
prolongation of deadlines with regard to Telekom liberalization at the end of 2003.   
 
 
II.3. Emergent measures against special products import (Article XIX of GATT and 
Safeguard Agreement) 
 
II.3.1 The historical and economic reasons for the existence of safeguards 
 
The existence of a clause to avoid the obligations deriving from free trade dated even 
before the existence of article XIX in GATT. Unite States of America were the first who 
used such a clause in 1943 and later President Truman issued an act which defined that 
such a clause should be included in all the trade agreements that America 
concluded78.Later this clause as named “Safeguards against special products import” and 
it was foreseen in article XIX of GATT 47. But the reason for having such a clause even 
in GATT is not yet clear. Many skeptics about this article call it an opposition to the trade 
liberal and competing spirit foreseen by GATT. In spite of this attitude, here are at least 
fur arguments for this clause existence79 and they are: 
 
1) Reestablishing the competitiveness conditions 
The measures established in the framework of article XIX give to the damaged 
industry the possibility to revive and adapt again to the competition conditions. By this 
time and these measures the possibility is given to industry to regenerate revenues and 
maximize the profit. The international trade market and especially the consumers do not 
profit from this situation. 
2)  Costs redistribution 
Article XIX is a means for the costs distribution and the market adjustment. Since the 
local producers encounter a competitive import product, then they are obliged to start the 
production o competitive products for import, and such a phenomenon is accompanied by 
the readjustment of the factors: worker, human capital physical capital, etc.  
                                                 
76 see: for example, articles 65, 66 of TRIPs- (Agreement of Trade Aspects Intellectual Property Rights) 
77 see : Bahla “International Trade Law and Theory” supra note 2, p. 579 
78 ibid., p. 1118 
79 ibid., 
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      3)  Political saving valve  
      In such a situation when one of the industries is harmed by import increase the 
existence of this clause gives to the government the chance to take all the measures to 
protect it. In its absence, the pressure on government would lead the latter to take more 
protective measures for the local production, which might comprise violation of WTO 
rules. 
4) Theory of public selection 
This clause urged the WTO member countries and concretely the GATT members to 
take part in more binding concessions, something that could not be realized in the 
absence of this clause. This theory is nothing else than the application of macroeconomic 
instruments in the in political behavior. Article XIX in this context authorizes 
policymakers to focus more on the needs of a harmed industry. It serves as a key to 
regulate the trade off between market liberalism, created during the agreement signing 
and the possibility to protect after the agreement has entered into force. So, in some way, 
the existence of this clause helps the policymakers to avoid the "fear", coming as a 
consequence of undertaking numerous obligations. S a conclusion, the existence of this 
clause creates the conditions for accommodation WTO member states interests,   within 
the interests and the nature of the agreement itself.  
 
 
 
II.3.2  Emergent measures against import and Article XIX of GATT 
 
In the framework of the articles which allow temporary avoidance or protection 
from the obligations deriving from GATT, there is article XIX of GATT, which allows 
the taking o some measures (called protection measures) against the import of a product, 
when it is thought that the local industry has been harmed, with the purpose of 
readjusting it, so that it can be revived.  
Te harm on this industry should come by a direct effect which is caused by bthe 
import increase and it is not necessary to be demonstrated that the imports are dump or 
subsided by the respective states. Uruguay Round brought the creation of "Safeguards 
Agreement", which explains and elaborates in a more complete way article XIX of 
GATT. In case of conflict between article XIX of GATT and one article of the agreement 
in question, the latter has priority.  
Article XIX and the agreement require that, if an unforeseen situation happens in 
a member country and it causes harm on the similar local production and the directly 
competing on, then this country takes protection measures suspending the obligation in 
general or by removing or modifying the tariff concessions. 
With regard to the word "unforeseen development" the Appeal Body in WTO 
gave in the case Argentina Footwear80 and Korea-Dairy81 a more detailed clarification of 
what is meant by this term. The safeguards agreement contains no definition for this 
situation, the only clarification is given somewhat in article XIX:1(a). Referring to the 
very meaning of the word "unforeseen", TA foresees this situation as unexpected for the 
                                                 
80 Case: "Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear” , W/T/DS121/AB/R, adopted on 14 / 12/ 
1999 
81 Case: “Korea-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy Products”, W/T/DS98/AB/R 14 /12/ 1999 
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local industry. So the situation should be unexpected and the conditions that dictated it 
should complete the requirements of article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement and these 
requirements are: 1) the product has been imported `to that extent and in those 
conditions; 2) which cause;3)a serious harm or a threat for serous harm to the local 
industry.  
WTO Safeguard Agreement requires that the member countries may apply a safeguard 
measure only after an investigation carried out by the relevant authority and make it 
public according to requirements of article X of GATT 94. 
 
II.3.3 A general survey on WTO Safeguard Agreement (SA) 
 
• As we mentioned above, a safeguard is applied when we are in the conditions of 
article XIX of GATT. The measures should not be discriminating for the countries, save 
the cases when there are preferential relations and in the cases when the quotes are set, 
which show that the big imports come from a special country.  
• Measures should be placed after a complete investigation by a public competent 
authority, an investigation which starts at the request of the enterprises, the product of 
which has been harmed by this import. The notification should be made for all the 
interested groups and the possibility should be given to the latter to give their opinion.  
•      “Serious harm” or “threat for serious harm” of industry should be assessed during 
the investigation when this harm has become evident. 
• It should be demonstrated that the import increase has caused serious harm. And 
moreover if other factors other than import increase have cause the harm, these factors 
should be taken into account. 
• If applied the safeguards should protect r prevent the serious harm attributed only 
to import increase and facilitate the revival of the local industry. The measures should be 
liberalized increasingly. These measures include tariffs and quantity restrictions. 
• The safeguards are limited in 4 years, but they may be prolonged to 8 years and 
the applicant country should prove that the industry is still harmed and still needs revival. 
• If the measure has been applied more than 3 years, than it should be reviewed 
and if possible remove or liberalize in an accelerated way. 
• The country applying such a measure, should demonstrate that it keeps 
substantially an equivalent level of concession with the country which is influenced by 
this export restriction. The countries I question may agree for the compensation. And if 
no agreement is reached, the exporting country may respond unilaterally. However this 
right is used by the countries influenced by safeguards for three years, or by countries 
where this measure has been used against imports which have increased in relative terms, 
but not yet in absolute terms82 compared to local product. 
• The safeguards may be applied against import by developing countries as long as 
it comprises 3% of the total import, or the import from the developing countries 
comprises 9 % of all imports. 
                                                 
82 The absolute and the relative increase define two different situations which do not necessarily coexist. 
So, with the absolute increase it may happen that the exports of an importing country may increase, without 
necessarily having an increase of the local production. Whereas in the relative increase, though import has 
not increased, again compared to local production it marks an increase, because the latter has decreased. 
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    This agreement found a large application in WTO framework. However in the 
case of Albania it cannot be invoked, because our country has accepted not to apply it as 
long as the inner legislative framework is missing83. So as a consequence, there is a need 
to issue a law that enables the application o safeguards and reflects the rights and 
obligations deriving from the agreement.  
 
II.4 Government assistance for the economic development (Article XVIII of 
GATT 1994) 
 
Article XVIII of GATT was included in the category of those articles that create 
special and particular treatments for the developing countries and the less 
developed countries. This argument is not drawn fro the article's content, but from the 
explanations and argumentations made on its existence. This article among others allows 
the modification or the removal of concessions in certain situations based on some 
procedures defined in it: I principle it aims at  ensuring the protection of a developing 
countries industry, when there is a claim that it influences in the development f the 
economy and the increase of life standard in a country84.  
Firstly, article XVIII: A & C of GATT 94 foresees protection for the infant 
industry. In order for the claim of a country to rely on these sections it should argue that 
this industry:  a) is in the early stage of development and b) it influences the standards 
increase in that country. Moreover this country should prove that its government cannot 
help the development of this industry, with the purpose of increasing the citizens standard 
of living and/or no other measure consistent with the obligations deriving from GATT 
can be invoked in such a way that the goal can be reached, that is, to protect this 
industry85.   
The country willing to undertake such an action according to section A or C86 
should consult in advance the countries that have an interest for this concession and WT, 
and present the compensation scheme, which in value should be the same with the one 
required to be protected.  If no agreement is reached within 60 days, then the country 
willing to modify or remove the sanctions, may do it but at the same time it becomes 
subject of countervailing measures allowed by WTO87. 
Section B of article XVIII of GATT has been used more in WTO. This article 
refers to the payments balance and in order to realize this possibility, the country requires 
import quantitative restriction for the products it requires to protect. However, the 
protective mechanisms offered by this article do not have a great economic support 
because in most of the cases, import quantitative restrictions are not suitable measures to 
revive an industry and in general the mechanisms offered by this article cannot be 
replaced by measures that have more an economic sense as subsidies, public investments, 
                                                 
83 See: Protocol of Albania membership in WTO. W/T/ACC/ALB/53 and W/T/ACC/ALB/41, in WTO 
Webpage www.wto.org 
84 WTO CTD to review provisions on economic development , Bridges Trade News , Vol 6, No 31, 18 
September, 2002 
85 ibid., 
86 When tariffs modification is required, the claim of a country is supported by article XVIII; A, and the 
procedure as I mentioned is the same with hat of renegotiation, article XXVIII of GATT. Other paragraphs 
B and C allow quantity restrictions as protective measures for this industry. 
87 Article XVIII of GATT 
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and protective measures88. Moreover, WTO countries are depositing proposals related to 
the paragraphs of this article for further clarifications and the possibility and the concrete 
situations in which it can be used. 
The possibility of applying this article in Albania's conditions is limited, not only 
for the economical reasons elaborated above, but also for the fact that it is not qualified as 
a developing country or less developed country in WTO framework. 
 
II.5. Subsidy and countervailing measures (Article XVI of GATT and The Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, SCM) 
 
An important result of Uruguay Round is also the Agreement on Subsidy and 
Countervailing Measures (hereinafter SCM89), which completed materially and 
procedurally article XVI and article XVI of GATT 94 concerning subsidies. The new 
things brought by this agreement might be summarized in:  
• It gives for the first time the definition of "subventions" and "serious harm". 
• It prohibits exports subventions and the subsidy contingent used for the local 
production. 
• It creates a general idea about harms brought by some kinds of subsidies.  
• It defines and strengthens the procedures for showing the cases when the harm is 
serious in the foreign market. 
• It defines the categories of government assistance and which will be not – 
countervailing in the cases and terms defined by the agreement. 
• It requires by the developing and less developed countries to present the 
subsidized exports and the subsidized imports substitutes and to accelerate the 
presentation of these exports, when this country manages to be competitor in 
global markets for this product category. 
• It requires the application of conflicts solving system offered by WTO which will 
assist that the Jury reports are not blocked by those governments that are applying 
subsidies for exports90. 
Article 1 of the agreement defines that the subsidies are realized when there is: 1) 
financial contribution by the government or some other public organization within the 
territory of that country91 and 2) confer of benefit 92. Both conditions should exist 
simultaneously, that is a grant cannot be called subsidy if it does not confer benefit for 
the one receiving it. The agreement does not define what benefit is, but the Appeal Body 
in the case (Canada – Civil Airplanes)93 defined that:  the benefit is conferred when the 
receivers of the subsidy benefit to that level that would not be possible without this 
contribution94. 
In the context of countervailing measures, article 14 of the agreement SCM defines 
when this kind of measure gives benefits. The subsidies should also be specific, to 
                                                 
88 See Hoekman & Kotescki, supra note 67,  p. 339  
89 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
90 See: Raj Bahla: “The Uruguay Round SCM Agreement”,  
91 The agreement itself foresees a list of the kinds of financial contributions, like credits, grants, etc. 
92 Article 1 of SCM agreement, 1994 
93 Case – Canada – Rules influencing civil airplanes export. WT/DS70/AB/R  
94 Canada – Civil Airplanes, Report of TA, before 157 
 24
support one definite sector or product, otherwise it would be difficult to qualify a 
measure based on the agreement. There are three kinds of “specifics” defined by the 
agreement: Specific Companies – the government targets a specific company; Specific 
Industry – the government defines a special industrial sector; Specific Regions – the 
government subsidizes sectors in separate areas of the country. 
 The agreement defines three categories of subsidies:  
1) Subsidies prohibited by law or in fact – are those foreseen by article 3 of the 
agreement and are mainly those that are firstly linked to the performances in export95.    
2) Countervailing Subsidies – here are included those measures contested by WTO, or 
are subject of countervailing measures96. Subsidies in action are not expressly prohibited, 
but become subject of a complaint in WTO, when they cause negative effects disfavoring 
the other party. There are three kinds of negative consequences: 1) Harm on local 
industry and in this case the harmed country may use countervailing measures. 2) Serious 
harm is usually accompanied by exports displacement and the country may be suited as 
the harmer of the export interests for the other country. 3) When the benefits conferred by 
GATT 94 are aggravated.  For example, when market access increases as a result of 
tariffs decrease (in GATT framework), it is prevented by subsidies. 
3) Inactive Subsidies – are some subsidies conferred in certain conditions and situations. 
So, based on article 8.2 of the agreement clearly defined these exceptional cases: a) 
government assistance for industrial researches and activities related to competition; b) 
government assistance for some areas in disadvantage; c) government assistance to adapt 
the work environment to the requirements for environment protection. In these cases the 
countervailing measures cannot be applied.  
 
II.5. 1 Countervailing Measures 
 
Part V of SCM agreement foresees when a country may use countervailing 
measures an for this, they are foreseen materially, that is, when such a measure can be 
taken, and procedurally, so the way in which it can be taken. A country may apply a 
countervailing measure only when it reaches the conclusion that imports have been 
subsidized and have caused harm on local production. A causal relation should exist 
between these two conditions, because otherwise such measures cannot be applied. The 
conditions which define whether a product has been subsidized or not have been given in 
broad lines above and they are reflected in the first part of the agreement.  
This part foresees the first and the final steps to be taken, and the time during 
which this measure will be applied. These steps should be transparent and all the 
interested parties should give their opinion on this decision and the relevant authority 
should give a complete explanation on how did it achieve these results.    
 
 
II.5.2 Notification 
 
                                                 
95 Together with the agreement there is an annex list for prohibited subsidies. 
96 See: “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement) overview” in WTO 
Webpage. 
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Based on the agreement for both kinds of measures, the subsidies and the 
countervailing measures, every WTO member is obliged to notify the SCM Committee. 
Article 25 of the agreement requires that all the member countries notify the subsidies 
used for all kinds of industries sectors and agricultural subsidies. The notifications made 
are subject of discussion and review in SCM Committee. On the other hand, article 32.6 
of the agreement foresees the notification for all the laws and acts issued in the 
framework of countervailing measures. In this case the countries should notify the first 
measures taken, the final acts, the time of this measure application, and the relevant 
authority dealing with the investigation97.  
 As in the case of protecting measures against imports increase, Albania cannot 
use the countervailing measures for the subsidized products, because it has not completed 
the legal framework. As in the first case, the legislation completion is a necessity, 
because many of our trade partners export subsidized exports. The completion of this 
legal framework would give to the local business the possibility to better protect n the 
conditions of unfair competition.  
  
 
II.6. Anti dumping measures (Article VI; 1-2, 4-6 of GATT, and the Agreement on 
the Application of Article VI of GATT (Antidumping Agreement ADA) 
 
Article VI of GATT foresees that dumping is caused when an exporter sells product 
in the foreign market at a lower cost than the product value itself. So, in broad lines, this 
practice happens when the price, with which the producer offers the product, is lower 
than that offered in his on country98. The difference between the local price and that in 
the foreign market is usually called "dump margin". The formula used to calculate the 
dump is:  
Dump percentage99 = Normal value – export price  X 100 
     Export Price 
 
The discipline offered by GATT for dumping was completed by the Code 
negotiated in Kennedy Round. Anti Dumping Agreement, (hereinafter ADA) was 
concluded in Uruguay Round and it became part of the Sole Package offered by this 
Round.  
ADA, offers more details and rules for all the anti dumping procedures, fro the 
investigation and certification that it exists up to taking countervailing measures to 
protect the local production and to eliminate the unfair trade100.  
Like the agreement for SCM, ADA also comprises of material and procedural 
articles.  First, article 2 of the agreement defines the dump calculation according to the 
formula explained above. This formula foresees a standard dumping calculation, whereas 
article 2.2 of ADA foresees the alternative ways of dumping calculation. These ways are 
used in the cases when the usual trade situation has no product sales in the exporting 
country market,  then the comparison is made with the export price of a third country 
                                                 
97 See: “SCM Agreement, a General Overview” WTO Webpage. 
98 I this case the selling price in the country market is equal to the product value. 
99 If the formula value is positive then there is dump, if it s negative or zero, then there is no dump.  
100 See: John Jackson “World Trading System”, Second Edition 2002, p. 247-274  
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proving that he export price includes the product value plus the administrative selling 
cost. Further are the rules on he bases of which the material harm will be defined. It is 
important to certify even in the case, as I the case of SCM, that there is a causal relation 
between dump and the harm caused to an industry by this dump101.  
The definition of what comprises local industry is an important element defined 
by the agreement. So article 4 of ADA classifies as "local industry" that industry, which 
produces "similar products"102 to those imported and is dump.  
Concerning the procedural aspect, the agreement has foreseen as the main 
requirement the existence of transparency, that is al the investigations and measures that 
should be made transparent. The investigation may start by a petition of the harmed 
producers and the further actions are realized by the specialized public authority. All the 
investigation rules have been foreseen in the agreement. For example, the investigation 
may not last more than 1 month from its starting day.  
Article 9 of the agreement defines the measures taken by the country whose 
industry has been harmed by dump products and the rules about its compensation. In this 
case a customs tax is set, the value of which should be lower than the dump 
percentage103. Another measure is that when the price is undertaken by the exporters, 
who increase it (the price) in order to eliminate the harm of the local product104. One of 
the achievements of the agreement is the so-called "sunset" clause (article 11 of ADA), 
which foresees the possibility of reviewing the antidumping measures within 5 years 
from their application date.  
The continuous notification of the measures taken in the framework of 
antidumping and their application should become known in advance WTO Antidumping 
Practices Committee.  
ADA agreement is one of the agreements invoked largely n the mechanisms of 
conflicts solving in WTO, and its articles have been further clarified and elaborated by 
the Jury and the Appeal Body105.  
Albanian Parliament has approved the law on Antidumping and the latter is a 
reflection of the agreement articles. However, its application requires a better 
understanding of the law itself, and a better cooperation among the business and public 
authority groups to carry out the investigations so that the harm caused to the local 
business dump imports can be eliminated. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Free trade promotion, harmonization of trade policies and balances preservation 
in economic developments, until the alleviation of global poverty, nowadays, comprise 
World Trade Organization prerogatives.  The latter was conceived not only to sanction 
the principles and terms in which these aims would be realized, but to also offer suitable 
                                                 
101 Article 3 of ADA foresees the factors to be taken into account in defining the harm and paragraph 5 f the 
article requires the existence of the relation between the two elements. 
102 Similar products are those having common characteristics and replacing each other. 
103 See paragraph 3 article 9 of ADA. 
104 See Article 8 of ADA 
105 For more see: “Agreement on application of Article VI of GATT, a general view". In WTO Webpage, 
www.wto.org 
 27
mechanisms for achieving them. The bodies created in this organization realize the 
participation of member countries in making global policies but however, the possibility 
developing and less developed countries to impose on this decision taking remains 
contested. This process often is turned into a battlefield of hot debates and clash of 
interests. 
The mechanism of conflicts solving is another possibility which guarantees 
predictability of trade relations and realization of rights and obligations for al the parties I 
agreement. Though its role today is limited in the demand and obligation for 
compatibility the fact that a great number of o cases goes to the Conflicts Solving Bodies 
shows that this mechanism works and marks an achievement in international trade 
relations. WTO includes a series of fields which make its action range more complex. 
Under its umbrella it is aimed to crystallize more and more fields which are connected to 
market liberalization. 
By WTO membership, Albania creates more possibilities to develop an economy 
in accordance with the international rules and standards. In the membership framework it 
has undertaken a series of commitments, which affect fields with a great economic 
importance, therefore the trade policies are accompanied debates efforts of all groups of 
interest to keep the balance between trade liberalization and local business strengthening.  
In spite of the difficulties, the participation in WTO remains a necessary condition for the 
prevalence of rule and law I trade relations, a condition affecting directly the economic 
development of the country.    
All the actions coming against these liberalizing processes comprise an open 
violation of its agreement articles. Therefore in order to keep a continuous balance 
between the various groups of interests and the unexpected trade developments, WTO 
member countries have allowed special clauses used to protect local industries. Once 
again it should be stressed that their application should be made only when the terms 
foreseen by the law, that is, by WTO agreements, are fulfilled and only on the basis of 
respective procedures. In every case of its use, the reciprocity and liberalizing balances 
preservation is required and they are realized through the obligation for compensation 
and by setting deadlines and the possibility to reassess the protective measures and 
conditions that created them. 
The protection of local industries from the import increase is realized by articles 
that allow the tariffs negotiation and the application of protective measures, when it is 
certified that imports increase up to the point of harming the local production. For both 
mechanisms a compensating scheme is offered for the trade partners.  
Another group of protective measures refers to the cases when we have to do with 
unfair trade, like dump or subsidized imports. In these cases no compensation is required, 
but a transparency in taking countervailing measures and the protection level should be 
no bigger than the harm caused. 
WTO agreements and Conflicts Solving Bodies have offered a field of application 
and consolidation for these rights. The questions coming to WTO on the basis of these 
articles have helped in a better understanding o the protection possibilities foreseen by 
the agreements.  
In the conditions of Albania a difficulty is observed in the qualification of 
concrete situations, that is, the possibility to protect within the legal room offered by the 
agreements, because in most of the cases the respective legislation does not exist, or there 
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is not a good articulation of the local business claims. Therefore the cooperation among 
groups of interest, (Government - Business), t complete the legal framework and preserve 
the conformity with WTO laws, is the only way to avoid the conflicts and strengthen the 
market economy.  
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